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The New Plague: False Claims Liability 
Based on Inequitable Conduct During 
Patent Prosecution 
Gregory Michael, William Newsom, and Matthew Avery* 
 
In January 2009, Amphastar Pharmaceuticals filed a first-of-its-
kind qui tam suit on behalf of the federal government and several states 
alleging that its competitor, Aventis Pharma, violated the Federal False 
Claims Act (“FCA”) when it fraudulently acquired a patent and then 
overcharged the government for its patented drug. By utilizing a fraudu-
lently acquired patent to elevate the price of Lovenox, a drug for treating 
deep-vein thrombosis, Amphastar alleged that Aventis had overcharged 
the government for every Lovenox pill purchased with government funds, 
including all prescriptions funded in part by Medicare or other federal 
insurance programs. The FCA provides a means for litigants to pursue 
recovery for fraud perpetrated against the federal government. In its 
complaint, Amphastar alleged that Aventis obtained its patent by engag-
ing in inequitable conduct during prosecution of its patent application 
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Our analysis of 
FCA claims based on this novel inequitable-conduct theory concludes 
that a patentee could be liable for violating the False Claims Act if (1) 
the government purchased the patented product, (2) the prices of that 
product were in fact elevated because of the exclusivity provided by the 
fraudulently obtained patent, and (3) the patentee knew, deliberately 
ignored, or showed reckless disregard in deciding to submit a claim for 
payment from the government at this elevated price. If the court in Am-
phastar finds Aventis liable under this novel theory, the consequences 
                                                                                                                            
*  Mr. Michael is a J.D. Candidate at the University of California, Hastings College of 
the Law, 2015. Mr. Newsom is an Associate at Cooley LLP in Palo Alto, California. Mr. 
Avery is an Associate at Baker Botts LLP in Palo Alto, California. The views expressed in 
this Article are the Authors’ alone, and do not necessarily reflect those of their affiliated 
institutions. 
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could be far-reaching. Given the nature of modern patent litigation, with 
inequitable conduct defenses being nearly ubiquitous, such a ruling could 
expose nearly every patent holder that does business with the federal gov-
ernment to possible liability under the FCA. 
This Article discusses the implications of bringing FCA claims based 
on an inequitable-conduct theory, explores the rationale behind invoking 
the FCA in this context, and suggests precautions that practitioners can 
take in such lawsuits. It proposes a variety of reforms to the False Claims 
Act to check the problems caused by these types of FCA claims. These 
proposals may become more relevant after the resolution of the Amphas-
tar case if the court validates Amphastar’s novel theory and others fol-
low suit in bringing FCA claims against pharmaceutical patent holders. 
 
I have based the [qui tam provision of the False 
Claims Act] upon the old-fashioned idea of holding 
out a temptation, and “setting a rogue to catch a ro-
gue,” which is the safest and most expeditious way I 
have ever discovered of bringing rogues to justice. 
–U.S. Senator Jacob M. Howard1 
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In January 2009, Amphastar Pharmaceuticals filed a lawsuit 
under the Federal False Claims Act (“FCA”) alleging that its 
competitor Aventis Pharma fraudulently inflated the price of Lo-
venox (enoxaparin), a patented drug for treating deep-vein throm-
bosis, and overcharged the federal government and various state 
governments by making claims for payment through Medicare and 
state Medicaid systems.2 The FCA provides a means for both pri-
vate litigants and the Department of Justice to pursue recovery for 
fraud perpetrated against the federal government.3 Amphastar’s 
FCA suit was based on the novel theory that Aventis defrauded the 
government when it fraudulently acquired its patent by engaging in 
inequitable conduct while prosecuting its patent application before 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).4 
Aventis’s fraudulent acquisition of this patent allowed it to mono-
                                                                                                                            
2 Memorandum and Order Re: Amended Complaint at 2, Amphastar Pharmaceuticals 
Inc., v. Aventis Pharma SA, No. 5:09-cv-00023, (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2013). 
3 See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2012). 
4 Memorandum and Order, supra note 2, at 2.  
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polize Lovenox sales, elevate the price of the drug, and illegally 
overcharge the government.5 This lawsuit is currently being liti-
gated and it is unclear whether Amphastar’s theory of FCA liability 
based on inequitable conduct is even valid, let alone whether Am-
phastar will prevail.6 
Under the patent law doctrine of inequitable conduct, a patent 
can be held unenforceable if a court finds that the patentee ob-
tained the patent by engaging in improper conduct before the 
USPTO.7 Once referred to as an “absolute plague” on the patent 
system by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, inequitable 
conduct is routinely asserted by defendants in patent cases.8 Com-
mon examples of inequitable conduct include making false state-
ments to the patent office or intentionally withholding material in-
formation during prosecution.9 Where a patentee engages in ine-
quitable conduct and then sells its patented product to the govern-
ment (or seeks reimbursement through programs such as Medi-
care), it can be argued that the improperly obtained patent allowed 
the patentee to sell its product at fraudulently inflated prices, the-
reby violating the FCA by submitting a false claim for payment.10 
Consequently, if Amphastar’s theory prevails, it could expose 
                                                                                                                            
5 Id. 
6 The parties are currently disputing the sufficiency of Amphastar’s allegations that 
Aventis submitted a fraudulent claim, and whether the allegations are supportable by 
evidence. 
7 See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011). 
8 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en 
banc) (“[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has 
become an absolute plague.”); Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289 (“Left unfettered, the 
inequitable conduct doctrine has plagued not only the courts but also the entire patent 
system.”). Note, however, that the en banc court in Therasense heightened the standard 
for finding inequitable conduct, as discussed in more detail in Part II, infra. 
9 See, e.g., Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH, 237 F.3d 1359, 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“To prove inequitable conduct in the prosecution of a patent, [the 
defendant] must have provided evidence of affirmative misrepresentations of a material 
fact, failure to disclose material information, or submission of false material information, 
coupled with an intent to deceive.” (quoting Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGraw, Inc., 149 F.3d 
1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998))). 
10 See, e.g., Delia A. Stubbs, Court Rules in Novel False Claims Act Case Where One 
Pharmaceutical Company Sues Another, FDA L. BLOG (Apr. 24, 2013, 6:35 PM), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2013/04/court-rules-in-
novel-false-claims-act-case-where-one-pharmaceutical-company-sues-another.html. 
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nearly every patent holder that does business with the federal gov-
ernment to possible liability under the FCA and create a new pla-
gue on the patent system. 
This Article explores the implications of bringing FCA claims 
based on this novel theory of inequitable conduct. Part I of this Ar-
ticle provides a brief overview of federal and state false claims laws. 
In addition to claims by competitors like those in the Amphastar v. 
Aventis case, this theory provides an avenue for whistleblowers to 
profit from their knowledge of fraudulent conduct by serving as a 
relator in a false claims qui tam action.11 Alternatively, a defendant 
in a patent infringement suit may gain access to confidential infor-
mation that could invalidate the patent and be used as the basis for 
a qui tam action. Part II provides an overview of the current state of 
the doctrine of inequitable conduct, which requires a showing that 
the patent holder’s conduct was both material to patentability and 
done with the specific intent to deceive the patent office. Part III 
discusses the Amphastar v. Aventis case, and then analyzes the sui-
tability and practicability of the inequitable-conduct-based theory 
of false-claims liability. Part IV provides strategic considerations 
for practitioners who are attempting to mitigate this type of false-
claims liability. Finally, Part V proposes modifications to the cur-
rent regulatory regime to resolve problems with FCA claims 
brought under a theory of inequitable conduct. 
I. FEDERAL AND STATE FALSE CLAIMS 
The Federal False Claims Act allows for both the Department 
of Justice and private whistleblowers, referred to as relators, to 
pursue actions against entities and individuals that have fraudulent-
ly claimed government funds.12 While originally enacted to prevent 
weapons manufacturers from knowingly selling faulty weaponry to 
the US Armed Forces, the FCA is now the primary means by 
which the government combats fraudulent claims for healthcare 
                                                                                                                            
11 A qui tam action is an action brought under a statute that allows a private party, 
known as a “relator,” to sue on behalf of the government. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1368 (9th ed. 2009). “Qui tam” is an abbreviation of the Latin phrase “qui tam pro 
domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,” meaning “[he] who sues in this 
matter for the king as well as for himself.” Id. 
12 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012). 
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benefits.13 In addition to the federal government, twenty-nine states 
and the District of Columbia have adopted false claims acts.14 In 
this section, we present background information regarding the 
Federal False Claims Act and a discussion of various state false 
claims acts. 
A. The Federal False Claims Act 
The Government Accountability Office recently estimated that 
approximately $72 billion in taxpayer funds is lost to fraud, abuse 
and improper payments each year.15 The Federal False Claims Act 
imposes civil liability on individuals and corporations that knowing-
ly make or submit false claims for money or property to the United 
States.16 Originally enacted in 1863 by President Abraham Lincoln, 
the FCA empowered citizens to bring suits on behalf of the gov-
ernment to police the sale of faulty goods to Union forces by war-
time profiteers.17 After several sweeping alterations, however, the 
FCA has become increasingly utilized to combat healthcare fraud.18 
The most recent of these changes occurred with the passage of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) in 2010.19 
                                                                                                                            
13 Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of Government 
Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 121, 128 (2001); Robert T. Rhoad 
& Matthew T. Fornataro, A Gathering Storm: The New False Claims Act Amendments and 
Their Impact on Healthcare Fraud Enforcement, 21 HEALTH LAW. 14, 15 (2009). 
14 U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE GREAT MYTHS OF STATE FALSE 
CLAIMS ACTS 3 (2013), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/
sites/1/State_FCA_Great_Myths_Pages_web.pdf. 
15 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMPROPER PAYMENTS: PROGRESS MADE BUT 
CHALLENGES REMAIN IN ESTIMATING AND REDUCING IMPROPER PAYMENT 3 (2009), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/122319.pdf. 
16 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012). 
17 Marc S. Raspanti & David M. Laigaie, Current Practice and Procedure Under the 
Whistleblower Provisions of the Federal False Claims Act, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 23, 24 (1998). 
18 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $3.8 Billion from 
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2013 (Dec. 20, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/December/13-civ-1352.html; see False Claims 
Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified as amended at 31 
U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2000)); see also Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-21 Stat. 1617 (2009); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 
3590, 111th Cong. 783-84 (2010) (enacted). 
19 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. 783-84 (2010) 
(enacted) (changes definition of “obligation” to included “retention of overpayments” 
thereby extending liability to persons receiving Medicare/Medicaid overpayments and 
knowingly failing to return the amount in excess). 
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According to the Department of Justice, the federal government 
recovered nearly $23 billion through use of the FCA between 2009 
and 2014.20 
In addition to providing a means for the government to directly 
recover funds lost through fraud, the FCA also allows private “re-
lators” to bring qui tam actions against defendants that have vi-
olated the FCA.21 Relators pursuing an action under the FCA’s 
whistleblower or qui tam provisions can receive fifteen to thirty 
percent of the proceeds of any successful claim.22 These false 
claims actions are discussed in more detail below. 
1. Liability 
The FCA identifies several types of actions that can give rise to 
liability.23 The two most commonly asserted provisions of the FCA 
establish liability for any person who “knowingly presents, or caus-
es to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or ap-
proval,” or “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, 
a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent 
claim.”24 For either of these provisions, the plaintiff must prove 
three essential elements: (1) that the defendant made a claim for 
payment from the government, (2) that the claim was false or frau-
dulent and (3) the defendant made the claim with knowledge of the 
falsity.25 
                                                                                                                            
20 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Nearly $6 Billion 
from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2014 (Nov. 20, 2014), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-nearly-6-billion-false-
claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2014 (estimating total recoveries under the FCA between 
January 2009 and September 2014 at $22.75 billion). 
21 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012). 
22 If the Department of Justice proceeds with the action, the originator of the claim is 
to receive between fifteen and twenty-five percent. If the government decides not to 
pursue the claim and the private person proceeds qui tam, that person is entitled to 
twenty-five to thirty percent. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012). 
23 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012) (listing seven specific actions that can give rise to 
liability under the FCA); see also United States v. Rivera, 55 F.3d 703, 709 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(“The paradigmatic example of a false claim under the FCA is a false invoice or bill for 
goods or services.”). 
24 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012). 
25 See id. § 3729(a) (emphasis added); Burke v. Record Press, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 26, 
29 (D.D.C. 2013). 
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The FCA defines a “claim” in two ways. First, a claim may be 
“any request or demand . . . for money or property” made to the 
United States government.26 In United States v. Alperstein, for ex-
ample, the government brought an action under the FCA alleging 
that a veteran had submitted false claims for free hospitalization to 
which he was not entitled.27 Alternatively, a claim may be made to 
any recipient of government funds where those funds were in-
tended to be used to advance the government’s interest.28 For ex-
ample, two subsidiaries of Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay over 
$81 million to resolve an alleged FCA suit claiming the companies 
had illegally promoted a drug for uses not approved of by the Food 
and Drug Administration, which resulted in false claims being 
submitted to government healthcare programs.29 Thus, any person 
receiving funds traceable to the federal government is potentially 
subject to liability under the FCA.30 
Such claims only violate the FCA, however, when they are 
“false or fraudulent.”31 Although the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the FCA broadly to include “all fraudulent attempts to 
cause the Government to pay out sums of money,” courts have al-
so recognized that not all forms of fraud give rise to liability under 
the FCA.32 For example, in United States ex rel. Groxx v. AIDS Re-
                                                                                                                            
26 31 U.S.C. §3729(b)(2) (2012). 
27 183 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Fla. 1960) aff’d, 291 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1961). 
28 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2) (2012). 
29 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Johnson & Johnson Subsidiaries to Pay 
Over $81 Million (Apr. 29th, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/
April/10-civ-500.html. 
30 By redrafting the definition of “claim” and the intent requirement in the Fraud 
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Congress effectively overruled the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Allison Engine Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, which held that 
a false claim must be made with the specific intent to defraud the government, rather than 
merely defrauding a contractor utilizing government funds. See 553 U.S. 662, 668–69 
(2008). 
31 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(1) (2012). 
32 United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 233 (1968) (“This remedial 
statute reaches . . . to all fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of 
money.”); United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958) (“[T]he False Claims Act 
was not designed to reach every kind of fraud practiced on the Government.”); see United 
States ex rel. Landers v. Baptist Mem’l Health Care Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 972, 978–79 
(W.D. Tenn. 2007) (precluding liability for violations of “the requirements providers 
must meet to participate in the Medicare program,” because the HCFA/CMS forms do 
not expressly or impliedly condition payment upon compliance with these conditions). 
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search Alliance–Chicago, the Seventh Circuit precluded liability for 
situations in which a certificate of compliance was falsified unless 
payment was actually conditioned on the receipt of such a certifi-
cate.33 In general, however, claims may be false or fraudulent on 
their face when the claimant seeks payment for more money than 
what is due.34 Other claims meet this requirement, for example, 
where the party fails to satisfy contractual requirements on which 
payment is conditioned.35 
A plaintiff must also prove that the defendant possessed 
“knowledge” of the falsity.36 But this knowledge requirement is 
broadly defined by statute to include: (1) having actual knowledge, 
(2) acting in deliberate ignorance, or (3) reckless disregard of the 
truth or falsity of the information.37 Thus, there is no requirement 
that an individual specifically intends to defraud the government; 
instead, a defendant merely needs to act with reckless disregard in 
committing the falsehood.38 
2. Qui Tam Provisions 
The FCA provides that a private party, known as a “relator,” 
may bring a so-called qui tam action on behalf of the United 
                                                                                                                            
33 415 F.3d 601, 604 (7th Cir. 2005) (“An FCA claim premised upon an alleged false 
certification of compliance . . . also requires that the certification of compliance be a 
condition of or prerequisite to government payment.”) 
34 See, e.g., Ry. Logistics Int’l v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 252, 260 (Fed. Cl. 2012) 
(holding that the contractor “outrageously inflated fraudulent claims” pertaining to the 
rehabilitation of the Iraqi Republic Railway). 
35 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 306 
(3d Cir. 2011) (holding that impliedly certifying compliance with preconditioned 
Medicare regulations incurs liability under the FCA). 
36 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012). 
37 Id. § 3729(b)(1) (2012). Prior to 1986, some courts required that a person have actual 
knowledge of the fraudulent information used in the claim submitted to the government. 
See, e.g., United States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118, 123 (9th Cir. 1970) (requiring the 
government to “prove that the defendant had the specific intent of deceit”). In 1986, 
Congress passed the False Claims Act Amendments, which modified 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(b)(1) to broaden the knowledge requirement as described above. 
38 See Eng’g & Const. Co. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 106 (Fed. Cl. 2003) (contractor 
acted knowingly, or in deliberate ignorance with reckless disregard of falsehoods when 
certifying the final bill). 
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States.39 The FCA provides specific procedural requirements and 
guidelines dictating how such actions may be brought.40 
First, a qui tam complaint must be filed under seal and kept as 
such for no less than sixty days, meaning that all records relevant to 
the case must be kept secret, even from the defendant, until after 
the court lifts the seal.41 The complaint and a written disclosure of 
all other relevant information known by the whistleblower must 
also be given to the Department of Justice.42 There is disagreement 
among the courts, however, as to the level of specificity required in 
the complaint. Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires that allegations of fraud must be pled with “particularity,” 
yet some circuits additionally require the plaintiff to identify specif-
ic false claims that were submitted for payment.43 
After receiving all the information filed by the relator, the gov-
ernment can then conduct its own investigation.44 Although the 
filings are initially kept under seal for sixty days, the government 
can seek an extension of time to continue its investigation.45 There 
are no detailed statistics on the average length of time complaints 
remain under seal, but the Department of Justice has indicated that 
it is not unusual for a complaint to remain sealed for two years or 
                                                                                                                            
39 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012). 
40 See id. 
41 Id. § 3730(b)(2) (2012). 
42 Id. 
43 The Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that Rule 9(b) requires 
that a complaint identify at least one false claim for payment made to the government in 
the pleadings while the First, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits merely require an 
allegation of a scheme to submit such claims. See United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda 
Pharm. N.A., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 457–58 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1759 
(2014); United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009); 
United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 29 (1st Cir. 
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3454 (2010); United States ex. rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce 
Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 854–55 (7th Cir. 2009); Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616 
F.3d 993, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2009) cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 801 (2010). 
44 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: A PRIMER 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf. 
45 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3) (2012) provides that “[t]he Government may, for good cause 
shown, move the court for extensions of the time during which the complaint remains 
under seal . . . .” 
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more.46 At the conclusion of its investigation, the government can 
either intervene and pursue the action itself or decline to take over 
the action, allowing the relator to proceed alone.47 If the Depart-
ment of Justice declines to intervene, then the government will not 
be a party to the proceedings, though it can still recover the majori-
ty portion of any verdict won by the relator.48 Fewer than twenty-
five percent of qui tam actions result in intervention by the gov-
ernment.49 
However, if the government does intervene, the Department of 
Justice will assume the primary role of prosecuting the action.50 
The relator may still remain a party to the action, but the court in 
such cases often imposes limitations on the relator’s participation 
if the government or the defendant shows that unrestrained partic-
ipation by the relator would be duplicative or cause undue delay.51 
Moreover, the government can dismiss the action even over the 
objection of the relator provided the relator is given an opportunity 
for a hearing, or to settle with the defendant provided that the 
court determines the settlement to be fair.52 In contrast, the relator 
may only settle or dismiss the action with the consent of the gov-
ernment.53 
If the government declines to intervene, the relator may pro-
ceed with the action qui tam.54 However, the government retains 
the right to intervene at a later date, and may request to be served 
with copies of any filings or deposition transcripts.55 After the court 
                                                                                                                            
46 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FALSE CLAIMS ACT CASES: GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN 
QUI TAM (WHISTLEBLOWER) SUITS 2 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/
pae/Civil_Division/InternetWhistleblower%20update.pdf. 
47 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (2012). 
48 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2012) (establishing that the government is entitled to a 
minimum of seventy percent of recovered funds where the DOJ decides not to pursue any 
action). 
49 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 2. 
50 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (2012). 
51 Id. Such limitations may include limiting the number of witnesses the relator may 
call, the length of those witnesses’ testimony, the cross-examination of witnesses or 
otherwise limiting the relator’s participation as the court deems necessary. Id. 
52 Id. § 3730(c)(2)(A)–(B). 
53 Id. § 3730(b)(1). 
54 Id. § 3730(b)(3). 
55 Id. However, the government must make a showing of good cause to intervene at a 
later date. Id. 
758 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:747 
 
unseals the complaint, the relator must serve the complaint upon 
the defendant within 120 days.56 
Penalties for violating the FCA can be harsh. If the government 
or relator is able to prove that the defendant violated the FCA, then 
the court may award up to triple the amount of actual damages suf-
fered by the government because of the fraud, as well as costs and a 
civil penalty from $5,500 to $11,000 per claim.57 In situations 
where the government intervenes, the relator is entitled to fifteen 
to twenty-five percent of the government’s total recovery, whether 
through a favorable judgment or settlement.58 The exact percen-
tage is dependent on the extent to which the information brought 
forth by the relator “substantially contributed to the prosecution of 
the action.”59 But if the government declined to intervene and the 
relator proceeds alone, then the relator is entitled to receive twen-
ty-five to thirty percent of the total recovery, plus an amount for 
reasonable expenses, attorneys’ fees, and costs.60 However, the 
FCA also permits the court to lower these awards to whatever the 
court considers appropriate after taking into consideration the rela-
tors role in advancing the case.61 
The FCA bars qui tam actions under certain circumstances.62 
For example, such actions cannot be pursued by a relator with 
“unclean hands,” like someone convicted of criminal conduct aris-
                                                                                                                            
56 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 3. 
57 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012). However, the court may impose as low as double 
damages if the defendant fully cooperates with the government in a timely manner prior 
to the commencement of any criminal, civil or administrative investigation into the 
alleged violations. Id. § 3729(a)(2). 
58 Id. § 3730(d)(1). This section also allows for a reduced award of no more than ten 
percent where the court determines that the information arose primarily from disclosures 
of specific information related to “allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or 
administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative or Government Accounting 
Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media . . . .” Id. 
59 Id.; see United States v. Gen. Elec., 808 F. Supp. 580 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (awarding the 
relator twenty-two percent of the amount recovered by the United States even though the 
relator could have disclosed the information earlier). 
60 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2012). 
61 Id. § 3730(d)(3); see United States ex rel. Burr v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Florida, 
Inc., 882 F. Supp. 166 (M.D.Fla. 1995) (awarding the relator fifteen percent rather than 
twenty-five percent where the relator’s contribution was minimal and vigorously opposed 
settlement without merit). 
62 31 U.S.C § 3730(e) (2012). 
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ing from his role in the FCA violation.63 The FCA also bars pur-
suing a qui tam action where another individual is already doing 
so.64 This is known as the “first-to-file bar.” Furthermore, the 
FCA has a statute of limitations barring actions filed more than the 
later of six years from the date of violation or three years after the 
government knows or should have known of the violation, but in no 
event longer than ten years after the violation of the FCA.65 
The most litigated affirmative defense, however, is the “public 
disclosure bar,” which bars qui tam actions that are based on pub-
licly disclosed information.66 There is widespread debate among 
the circuits, however, as to what constitutes “public disclosure.” 
Some circuits, for example, require only a modest amount of dis-
closure before it rises to the level of public disclosure.67 Others re-
quire that the information be “widespread and notorious” before 
the bar is triggered.68 However, the FCA provides an exception to 
the bar where the relator is an “original source” of the informa-
tion.69 An original source is a person who either voluntarily pro-
vided the government with the information prior to the public dis-
closure or who has significant independent knowledge beyond what 
has already been publically disclosed.70 
Congress recently narrowed the public disclosure bar and ex-
panded the original source exception in the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010.71 Under these changes, the court 
                                                                                                                            
63 Id. § 3730(d)(3). 
64 Id. § 3730(b)(5). 
65 Id. § 3731(b). 
66 Id. § 3730(e)(4). To trigger the public disclosure bar, the information must have 
been disclosed in a (1) criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in which the government 
or its agent is a party; (2) congressional, Government Accountability Office, or other 
Federal report, hearing, or investigation; or (3) media report. See id. 
67 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fine v. Advanced Sciences, 99 F.3d 1000, 1008 (10th 
Cir. 1996). 
68 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mossey v. Pal-Tech, 231 F. Supp. 2d 94, 97 (D.D.C. 
2002). 
69 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012). 
70 Id. § 3730(b)(4)(B). The FCA previously required that a relator must have “direct 
and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based” in 
order to qualify as an original source. This definition was altered in 2010 by the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 901. 
71 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. 783–84 (2010) 
(enacted); see also Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, 11 Stat. 1617, 1623 
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cannot dismiss an FCA claim based on the public disclosure bar if 
the government opposes dismissal of the qui tam action.72 Addi-
tionally, civil litigation to which the government or its agents are 
not a party cannot by itself give rise to a public disclosure.73 The 
Affordable Care Act also removed the requirement that an original 
source have “direct and independent knowledge” of the informa-
tion giving rise to the FCA violation.74 Now relators without direct 
knowledge of the violations can bring FCA claims, so long as they 
have independent knowledge that materially adds to the allega-
tion.75 In spite of these modifications, the public disclosure bar ap-
pears to remain a key issue in FCA qui tam actions.76 
B. State False Claims Actions 
Thirty states currently have false claims acts in place.77 While 
the state statutes vary to some degree, they generally employ the 
same procedures as those of the Federal False Claims Act, but with 
submissions filed with the state attorney general instead of the De-
partment of Justice. Where a relator uncovers fraud under a state-
administered Medicaid program, both the state’s false claim sta-
                                                                                                                            
(changes definition of “obligation” to include “retention of overpayments” thereby 
extending liability to persons receiving Medicare/Medicaid overpayments and knowingly 
failing to return the amount in excess). 
72 31 U.S.C § 3730(b)(4)(A) (2012). The alteration effectively overrules the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, which affirmed the bar as being 
jurisdictional and therefore non-waivable. 549 U.S. 457, 467–78 (2007). 
73 31 U.S.C § 3730(b)(4) (2012). 
74 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. 783–84 (2010) 
(enacted). 
75 31 U.S.C § 3730(b)(4)(B) (2012). 
76 See David M. Nadler & Justin A. Chiarodo, The Public Disclosure Bar: New Answers 
and Open Questions, 47 PROCUREMENT LAW. 1, 18 (2011). 
77 See JOHN F. CARROLL, CTR. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PUB. INTEGRITY, FALSE 
CLAIMS ACT: AN INSPECTOR GENERAL’S BEST FRIEND (Nov. 2014), available at 
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/public-integrity/files/comm
unity_contribution_-_john_carrol.pdf. States with false claims acts include California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode 
Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin, as well as the District of 
Columbia. Of these, Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New 
Hampshire, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin each employ “Medicaid only” False Claims 
Acts. 
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tute and the Federal False Claims Act would be implicated. Simi-
larly, in states where no false claims act exists, the federal funding 
component of a state-administered Medicaid program would likely 
be sufficient to justify use of the Federal False Claims Act to ad-
dress Medicaid fraud. 
Under the Social Security Act, each state with a false claims act 
of its own is eligible for a ten percent increase in the percentage of 
the false claims act recoveries for which a recovery is had.78 To 
qualify for the financial incentive, a state’s false claims act must: 
(1) establish liability to the state for false or fraudulent claims, as 
described in the Federal False Claims Act, with respect to Medica-
id spending; (2) contain provisions that are at least as effective in 
rewarding and facilitating qui tam actions for false or fraudulent 
claims as those described in the FCA; (3) contain a requirement for 
filing an action under seal for sixty days with review by the State 
Attorney General; and (4) contain a civil penalty that is not less 
than the amount of the civil penalty authorized under the FCA.79 
The federal Office of the Inspector General determines whether 
the state statute meets these criteria, and is thus eligible for the ten 
percent incentive.80 Unsurprisingly, the federal incentive has in-
creased the uniformity of the state false claims acts, at least insofar 
as Medicaid fraud is concerned. 
In addition to the state laws, several cities and counties have 
their own false claims acts. New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, 
and Allegheny County, Pennsylvania each have their own version 
of the False Claim Act with qui tam provisions, enabling them to 
recover money at the municipal or county level.81 
                                                                                                                            
78 Section 1909 of the Social Security Act provides that any state deemed to have 
qualifying laws may receive a ten-percentage-point increase in its share of any amounts 
recovered under such laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(h) (2012). 
79 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, OIG GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING STATE FALSE 
CLAIMS ACTS, *10 (Mar. 13, 2013), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/false
claimsact/guidelines-sfca.pdf. 
80 Roughly half of the thirty states with false claims acts currently meet these criteria. 
81 See, e.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 7, ch. 8 (West). 
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II. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 
Inequitable conduct is an affirmative defense in patent litiga-
tion, in which the defendant asserts that the patentee has procured 
its patent through improper conduct before the USPTO.82 This 
judicially created doctrine derives from a trio of Supreme Court 
cases dealing with the equitable doctrine of unclean hands.83 Prior 
to the development of the inequitable conduct doctrine, courts of-
ten refused to grant an injunction to a patentee that had engaged in 
egregious misconduct, and thus came to the court with “unclean 
hands.”84 Under the modern inequitable conduct doctrine, which 
is tantamount to defrauding the USPTO, the result of a successful 
showing by a defendant is even more severe. A finding of inequita-
ble conduct may not only jeopardize a company’s entire patent 
portfolio but may spark additional antitrust and unfair competition 
claims.85 
As obtaining a patent is an ex parte procedure, all persons subs-
tantively involved in the prosecution of the patent application owe 
a duty of candor to the USPTO.86 This duty requires these persons 
to disclose all known information material to patentability.87 Acts 
typically constituting inequitable conduct include failing to submit 
material prior art known by the applicant, failing to explain refer-
ences in a foreign language, misstatements of facts concerning pa-
tentability, and mis-description of inventorship.88 As full disclosure 
                                                                                                                            
82 See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
83 See Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1993); Precision 
Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945); Hazel-Atlas Glass 
Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944). 
84 See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1287. 
85 See Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (where 
inequitable conduct gave rise to an unfair competition claim); Walker Process Equip., Inc. 
v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 178 (1965) (where inequitable conduct gave 
rise to antitrust action). 
86 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (“Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a 
patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office . . . .”). 
87 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (“[All persons involved in the patent application owe] a duty to 
disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to 
patentability as defined in this section.”). 
88 See McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical, Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 913–26 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding inequitable conduct where attorney failed to disclose material 
information from related patent application); Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular 
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of information pertaining to an invention may contradict the self-
interests of many patent applicants, the doctrine of inequitable 
conduct imposes severe penalties for violating this duty. If the de-
fense is proved, the entire patent (and possibly all related patents in 
the same family) will be held unenforceable, even if the claims of 
the patent are otherwise valid.89 In fact, the effects of such a finding 
are so severe that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. recently referred to the 
doctrine as an “atomic bomb” and elevated the standard of what 
must be shown to prove inequitable conduct.90 
To prove inequitable conduct post-Therasense, an accused in-
fringer must show by clear and convincing evidence that the paten-
tee either failed to disclose, misrepresented, or submitted false in-
formation to the patent office (1) that was material to patentability 
and (2) with the specific intent to deceive the patent office.91 The 
intent and materiality are separate elements and the existence of 
one cannot provide the basis for inferring the other.92 Proving that 
an applicant should have known of the materiality of a reference 
but did not submit it to the USPTO, for example, does not satisfy 
the deceptive intent element by itself.93 
                                                                                                                            
Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256–57 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (inferring intent where applicant 
“knew or should have known” that information was relevant to the prosecution); Bruno 
Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs. Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1350–54 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (finding inequitable conduct for failure to cite U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
proceeding); Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(finding inequitable conduct for failing to disclose test data inconsistent with data 
disclosed in the specification); Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1194–95 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding inequitable conduct where applicant failed to disclose that 
declarations from outside experts had been previously employed by the applicant); 
Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1229–30 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (inequitable 
conduct found where applicant improperly claimed small entity status). 
89 Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 
1988); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex. Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also 
Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int’l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 808–12 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
90 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(en banc) (citations omitted). 
91 See id. at 1276. 
92 See id. (rejecting the “sliding scale” approach where a court requires less evidence of 
intent where a reference is highly material); see also Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega 
Corp., 232 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
93 Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
764 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:747 
 
Under Therasense, the defendant must show but-for materiality 
with respect to the patentee’s omission or misrepresentation to the 
patent office.94 Therefore, even when a patentee withholds infor-
mation, it only warrants a finding of inequitable conduct if, but-for 
the withholding, the patentee would not have been successful in 
prosecuting the claim. However, in heightening the standard to 
but-for materiality, the Federal Circuit carved out an exception in 
cases of affirmative egregious misconduct.95 Where a patent appli-
cant has engaged in such conduct, the materiality prong is met re-
gardless of whether the claim would have issued. An affirmative act 
of egregious misconduct includes actions such as intentionally fil-
ing false affidavits.96 Absent more telling actions, however, merely 
failing to disclose prior art references does not constitute such mis-
conduct. 
The second element of the inequitable conduct analysis re-
quires proving that the patentee deliberately decided to withhold, 
misrepresent, or falsify a known material reference with the intent 
to deceive the USPTO.97 In practice, this element provides a signif-
icant hurdle for defendants.98 Parties are rarely able to show direct 
evidence of deceptive intent. However, courts may infer such in-
tent from indirect and circumstantial evidence, provided that such 
an inference is “the single most reasonable inference able to be 
drawn from the evidence.”99 The evidence presented must there-
fore be “sufficient to require a finding of deceitful intent in the light 
of all the circumstances.”100 A patentee’s deceptive intent, there-
fore, cannot be inferred where multiple reasonable inferences may 
                                                                                                                            
94 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291. 
95 See id. at 1292 (carving out an exception for cases where a patentee “deliberately 
planned and carefully executed scheme[s]” to defraud the PTO). 
96 See id. (“When the patentee has engaged in affirmative acts of egregious 
misconduct, such as the filing of an unmistakably false affidavit, the misconduct is 
material.”). 
97 Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
98 Ryan Davis, Inequitable Conduct A Dying Defense 2 Years Post-Therasense, LAW360 
(May 23, 2013, 9:13 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/444480/inequitable-conduct-
a-dying-defense-2-years-post-therasense. 
99 Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
100 Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 873 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (emphasis added). 
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be drawn from the same evidence.101 As a result of the elevated 
standards for both materiality and specific intent, it is significantly 
more difficult to successfully raise an inequitable conduct defense 
under Therasense.102 
III. FALSE CLAIMS LIABILITY FOR INEQUITABLE 
CONDUCT 
The Central District of California recently denied Aventis 
Pharma’s motion to dismiss an FCA claim based on an inequitable 
conduct finding secured by its competitor Amphastar Pharmaceut-
icals in an underlying patent case.103 Amphastar alleges that Aven-
tis knowingly charged the government inflated prices for its deep-
vein thrombosis drug, Lovenox (enoxaparin), by illegally obtaining 
a patent through inequitable conduct before the USPTO.104 
This section provides background information pertaining to the 
pending FCA action initiated by Amphastar, discusses the parallels 
between antitrust claims based on inequitable conduct and Am-
phastar’s theory of false claims liability, and analyzes whether ine-
quitable conduct during patent prosecution can serve as a basis for 
FCA liability. We conclude that given the broadening of the False 
Claims Act in recent years, it is likely that a court would find ine-
quitable conduct to be a proper basis for a finding of FCA liability, 
provided certain other elements are proven. Consequently, nearly 
every patent holder that does business with the federal govern-
ment, which includes anyone producing pharmaceuticals covered 
by Medicare or other government programs, may soon be exposed 
to FCA liability based on Amphastar v. Aventis. 
A. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals v. Aventis Pharma S.A. 
The feud between Aventis and Amphastar began in 2003, when 
Amphastar filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application 
(“ANDA”) with the FDA seeking the right to manufacture a ge-
                                                                                                                            
101 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290–91 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
102 Davis, supra note 98. 
103 Memorandum and Order, supra note 2, at 2.  
104 Id. 
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neric version of Aventis’s Lovenox.105 In its ANDA, Amphastar 
asserted that Aventis’s patent covering Lovenox was invalid, unen-
forceable, and/or not infringed by Amphastar’s generic product.106 
Shortly after Amphastar filed its ANDA, Aventis sued Amphastar 
for patent infringement.107 Amphastar then successfully raised the 
defense of inequitable conduct and filed a counterclaim alleging 
that Aventis violated the antitrust laws by filing a baseless patent 
infringement suit.108 The district court granted Amphastar’s mo-
tion for summary judgment on its inequitable conduct defense, 
finding that Aventis concealed material information from the 
USPTO during prosecution and holding the patent unenforcea-
ble.109 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, 
holding that the district court applied an incorrect standard and 
directing the lower court to apply a clear and convincing evidence 
                                                                                                                            
105 Id. ANDAs are a frequently deployed mechanism for the early introduction of 
generic competition. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT 
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 10 (2002), available at https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-
study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf (reporting challenges involving 130 drugs between 1984 
and 2000); Examining the Senate and House Versions of the “Greater Access to Affordable 
Pharmaceuticals Act”: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 113, 117 
(2003) (statement of Timothy Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission) (noting 
challenges involving more than eighty drugs between January 2001 and June 2003). 
106 Amphastar’s ANDA contained a Paragraph IV certification against Aventis’s patent 
on Lovenox. As part of the ANDA, the generic applicant is required to make one of the 
following certifications regarding each patent listed in the Orange Book that claims the 
drug it seeks to copy: (I) that the drug is not patented or that patent information has not 
been filed; (II) that the patent has expired; (III) that the generic drug will not enter the 
market until the patent expires; or (IV) that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by 
the manufacture, use, or sale of the generic drug for which the application is submitted. 21 
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV). These are called Paragraph I, II, III, and IV 
certifications, respectively. By making a Paragraph IV certification, a generic 
manufacturer can seek FDA approval to market a generic equivalent of a pioneer’s 
patented drug before the patent term has expired. 
107 Subsection 271(e) of the Patent Act provides that making a Paragraph IV 
certification alone is an act of patent infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A). 
Consequently, the mere filing of an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification allowed 
Aventis to sue Amphastar for infringing its patent. 
108 Amphastar Pharm. Inc. v. Aventis Pharma SA, No. EDCV-09-0023 MJG, 2012 WL 
5512466, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2012). 
109 Id. (citing Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 2d 952 
(C.D. Cal. 2005)). 
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standard.110 On remand, the district court again found the patent 
unenforceable on inequitable conduct grounds and the Federal Cir-
cuit affirmed.111 
In the subsequent litigation, the district court dismissed Am-
phastar’s antitrust counterclaims on the grounds that the com-
plaint failed to allege an “antitrust harm,” a necessary element of a 
Sherman Act violation.112 Even if there had been a harm, the court 
found that Aventis was shielded from antitrust liability under the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which largely immunizes brand-name 
manufacturers from liability for petitioning the government, even if 
anticompetitive in nature.113 Unbeknownst to Aventis, Amphastar 
had also filed a qui tam complaint under seal with the district court 
in January 2009.114 After the government decided not to intervene 
in the qui tam suit, the complaint was unsealed in October 2011. 
Amphastar’s complaint asserted that Aventis made false state-
ments to the USPTO in order to acquire a patent, submitted false 
claims to the government for Lovenox,115 and then engaged in base-
less patent litigation with Amphastar in an effort to extend its illeg-
                                                                                                                            
110 Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
111 Id. at 1349. 
112 Amphastar Pharm. Inc. v. Aventis Pharma SA, No. EDCV-09-0023 MJG, 2012 WL 
5512466, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2012). 
113 Id. A patentee’s immunity from antitrust liability derives from the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine. This immunity may be broken if the defendant can prove that the infringement 
suit is a “mere sham” and in reality is “an attempt to interfere directly with the business 
relationships of a competitor.” This can occur where the patentee has engaged in illegal 
vertical agreements in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act or if the patentee has 
engaged in so called Walker Process fraud. See In re Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust 
Litigation, 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000); California Motor Transp. Co. v. 
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510–11 (1972) (“We said, however, in Noerr that 
there may be instances where the alleged conspiracy ‘is a mere sham to cover what is 
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships 
of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified.’”). 
114 Memorandum and Order, supra note 2, at 2. 
115 By seeking reimbursement or payment through Medicare or other federal programs, 
a seller of pharmaceutical products submits a claim for payment to the government within 
the meaning of the FCA. In this case, the fact that Lovenox was patented permitted 
Aventis to charge an elevated price for the drug, and submitting claims at that elevated 
price forms the basis for the “false” or “fraudulent” nature of the claims. 
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al monopoly.116 In ruling on motions to dismiss, the district court 
determined that although the finding of inequitable conduct had 
been publicly disclosed, Amphastar was the “original source.”117 
Nonetheless, the court dismissed the qui tam suit, with leave to 
amend, on the grounds that Amphastar failed to allege with parti-
cularity that Aventis’s false claims were paid for or approved by the 
government, as required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.118 
After amending its complaint, Amphastar asserted that Aventis 
(1) made false statements to the USPTO in prosecuting two phar-
maceutical patents (2) thereby illegally obtained monopoly power 
over enoxaparin in the US market and (3) leveraged that monopoly 
power to sell over six million units of Lovenox to the government 
or its distributors at inflated monopoly prices, totaling at least $470 
million in false claims between 1993 and 2002.119 This amended 
complaint survived additional motions to dismiss and is currently 
being litigated.120 
                                                                                                                            
116 Amphastar Pharm. Inc. v. Aventis Pharma SA, No. EDCV-09-0023 MJG, 2012 WL 
5512466, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2012). 
117 Id. at *2. 
118 Id. at *13. 
119 Amended Complaint at 12-13, ¶¶ 37, 41, Amphastar Pharmaceuticals Inc., v. Aventis 
Pharma SA, No. 5:09-cv-00023, (C.D. Cal. Dec. 03, 2012); Memorandum and Order, 
supra note 2, at 7. 
120 Most recently, on March 26, 2015, the Court denied Amphastar’s motion for issue 
preclusion, in which it sought to collaterally estop Aventis from contravening certain facts 
established during the prior ANDA litigation. Order Re: Issue Preclusion Motion at 1-2, 
Amphastar Pharmaceuticals Inc., v. Aventis Pharma SA, No. 5:09-cv-00023, (C.D. Cal. 
March 26, 2015). The Court noted that it was in the process of drafting its order on 
original source jurisdiction, regarding whether Amphastar was an “original source of the 
information,” on which the suit is based. Id. The issue of whether Amphastar is an 
“original source” is also being litigated in an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeal. Certification Order 8 U.S.C. § 1292(b) at 1, Amphastar Pharmaceuticals 
Inc., v. Aventis Pharma SA, No. 5:09-cv-00023, (C.D. Cal. June 6, 2014). In August 2014, 
the Ninth Circuit granted a petition for permission to appeal the district court’s Order 
denying Aventis’ Motion for Summary Judgment for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 31 
U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B), agreeing to examine what exactly a relator's pre-filing disclosure 
must include if the relator wishes to qualify as an "original source." Amphastar 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Aventis Pharma S.A., Case No. 14-56382 (9th Cir. 2014).  The 
parties have submitted opening, responsive, and reply briefs, though the Ninth Circuit 
has yet to issue an opinion. 
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B. Distinguishing Walker Process Claims 
Although Amphastar’s theory of false claims liability is novel, 
the use of the defense of inequitable conduct as the basis for a 
counterclaim is not unprecedented. In fact, inequitable conduct is 
frequently used as the basis for certain antitrust counterclaims, 
which are known as Walker Process claims. Such claims are typically 
brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits the 
use of anticompetitive conduct to acquire or maintain a monopo-
ly.121 A patent can give its owner market exclusivity, thereby 
thwarting competition in a given field for a limited period of time. 
However, when patent holders sue their competitors for infringe-
ment, they generally enjoy immunity from antitrust liability under 
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which immunizes petitioning the 
government for redress, even when such conduct is anticompeti-
tive.122 This immunity can be defeated, however, if the accused in-
fringer establishes that the patent was obtained from the USPTO 
through knowing and willful fraud, commonly referred to as Walker 
Process fraud.123 As discussed in Part II, supra, in order to prove in-
                                                                                                                            
121 See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (providing that “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to 
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”). 
122 See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovation, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 
1998); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 
136–37 (1961) (clarifying that “the Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons 
from associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take 
particular action with respect to a law that would produce a restraint or a monopoly” and 
that the “concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people to make their 
wishes known to their representatives”); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 
657, 670 (1965) (“Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence 
public officials regardless of intent of purpose . . . . Joint efforts to influence public 
officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate 
competition.”); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 
(1972) (“Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government.”). 
123 See Walker Process Equip., Inc., v. Food Machinery & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 
177 (1965) (holding that a party who uses a patent procured through intentional fraud on 
the USPTO to obtain or preserve a monopoly may be subject to antitrust liability). Note 
that Walker Process claims differ from Handgards claims, which are antitrust 
counterclaims that attempt to establish that the patent holder knowingly asserted a patent 
that was invalid or did not infringe the defendant’s technology merely to disrupt a 
competitors business practices. See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986 (9th 
Cir. 1979). 
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equitable conduct under the new Therasense standard, an accused 
infringer must demonstrate that a patentee made a material misre-
presentation to the patent office with the specific intent to deceive 
the patent office.124 This elevated standard for proving inequitable 
conduct is essentially the same as what is needed to prove Walker 
Process fraud.125 
In the same way inequitable conduct serves as the basis for 
Walker Process antitrust claims, inequitable conduct may also serve 
as the basis for FCA claims. Prior to Therasense, establishing Walk-
er Process fraud required significantly more than proving inequitable 
conduct.126 However, with the heightened standards adopted under 
Therasense, there is now a significant overlap between the elements 
of an inequitable conduct defense and a Walker Process counter-
claim.127 Similarly, a showing of fraud on the patent office may 
serve as the basis for establishing that the patent holder made a 
fraudulent claim for payment from the government in violation of 
the False Claims Act. However, there remain several key differ-
ences between Walker Process claims and FCA claims, which rend-
ers the analogy of using inequitable conduct as the basis for the lat-
ter problematic. 
1. Overview of Walker Process Antitrust Claims 
An antitrust claim relying on Walker Process fraud requires an 
accused infringer to show (1) the patent holder engaged in knowing 
and willful fraud before the USPTO in order to obtain the patent; 
(2) clear and convincing evidence of deceptive intent which must 
be independent of the evidence of fraud; (3) that the patent would 
                                                                                                                            
124 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(en banc). 
125 Asim M. Bhansali & William S. Hicks, Trial Management After Therasense: 
Inequitable Conduct, Walker Process Fraud, and the Seventh Amendment, 21 COMPETITION: 
J. ANTI. & UNFAIR COMP. L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 1 (2012). 
126 See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (“[I]nequitable conduct is a broader, more inclusive concept than the common law 
fraud needed to support a Walker Process counterclaim.”). 
127 See, e.g., Gideon Mark & T. Leigh Anenson, Inequitable Conduct and Walker Process 
Claims After Therasense and the America Invents Act, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 361, 403 (2014) 
(noting the “virtual alignment of inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud that was 
accomplished by Therasense”); see also Metris U.S.A., Inc. v. Faro Tech., Inc., 882 F. 
Supp. 2d 160, 174 (D. Mass 2011). 
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not have issued but-for the misrepresentation or omission of ma-
terial facts; and (4) that the patent holder was aware of this fraud 
while attempting to enforce the patent.128 These four elements 
form the crux of both Walker Process fraud and inequitable conduct, 
and provide grounds for breaking the antitrust immunity granted 
under Noerr-Pennington.129 To establish liability and damages under 
an antitrust theory, however, it is also necessary to prove the ele-
ments of a Sherman Act violation, including a showing that the pa-
tentee had monopoly power in a relevant and definable market, and 
willfully acquired or maintained that power through anticompeti-
tive behavior.130 
Both Walker Process claims and the defense of inequitable con-
duct are focused on misconduct before the USPTO and require 
that the patent applicant intentionally misled the examiner. Not 
surprisingly, both claims typically arise out of the same conduct 
and are supported by the same evidence.131 Prior to Therasense, ine-
quitable conduct was considered a “broader, more inclusive con-
cept than the common law fraud needed to support a Walker 
Process counterclaim.”132 However, Therasense raised the standard 
for inequitable conduct to essentially the same level as Walker 
Process fraud.133 
In spite of their similarities, there exist important distinctions 
between the two doctrines.134 Most significantly, Walker Process 
claims require proving the additional elements of an antitrust viola-
                                                                                                                            
128 See Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1068–71. 
129 The decision to strip a plaintiff of the Noerr-Pennington immunity is controlled by 
Federal Circuit law when the claim is brought in its jurisdiction, however the remainder 
of the antitrust analysis proceeds under the law of the circuit in which the claim arose. See 
Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1068; Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 
1341, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
130 See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 
(1965). 
131 See Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
132 Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1069. 
133 See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see 
also Metris U.S.A., Inc. v. Faro Tech., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 160, 174 (D. Mass 2011). 
134 Obviously there is a difference in result—inequitable conduct is a defense to 
infringement that renders a patent unenforceable, while Walker Process fraud subjects the 
patentee to antitrust liability including treble damages. 
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tion beyond what is necessary to establish inequitable conduct.135 
For example, prosecution of bad-faith patent litigation, where the 
patentee knows that its patent is invalid or that the defendant’s 
product does not infringe, can form the basis of a monopolization 
claim, but more is needed.136 While fraudulently procuring a patent 
constitutes inequitable conduct, that fraudulent action by itself has 
no competitive impact and thus cannot constitute a violation of the 
Sherman Act without more.137 Walker Process claims must rely on 
the enforcement of a fraudulently obtained patent that causes anti-
competitive injury; simply obtaining the patent, whether by fraud 
or not, is insufficient to establish the antitrust claim. 
2. Federal False Claims v. Walker Process Antitrust Claims 
A Walker Process claim and an FCA claim based on an inequita-
ble conduct theory are therefore closely related. In essence, a 
Walker Process claim relies on the theory that a fraudulently ob-
tained (or misused) patent permits the patentee to obtain monopo-
ly power and reap monopoly profits. Where inequitable conduct is 
the alleged fraud, a suit under the FCA based on this theory would 
essentially mirror a Walker Process claim. Rather than allege anti-
competitive effects under the Sherman Act, the government or re-
lator would assert that the fraudulently obtained patent (regardless 
of whether it was enforced) permitted the patentee to fraudulently 
overcharge the government for patented items. In other words, 
but-for the inequitable conduct before the USPTO, the product at 
issue would have been unpatented, subject to rigorous marketplace 
competition, and therefore significantly cheaper. A Walker Process 
claim requires a showing that a fraudulently obtained patent 
                                                                                                                            
135 Violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act requires showing (1) the possession of monopoly 
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power 
as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, 
business acumen, or historic accident. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–
71 (1966). 
136 See Bio-Technology Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 267 F.3d 1325, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 
2001); Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985), overruled by 
Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
137 FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., Inc., 835 F.2d 1411, 1418 n.16 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(“Mere procurement of a patent, whatever the conduct of the applicant in the 
procurement, cannot without more affect the welfare of the consumer and cannot in itself 
violate the antitrust laws.”). 
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granted the patent holder actual monopoly power in a definable 
market, and that the patentee then used the unlawfully obtained 
monopoly power to stave off competition and reap excessive prof-
its, thus causing antitrust injury to consumers. Similarly, an FCA 
claim requires a showing that a fraudulently obtained patent per-
mitted the patent holder to charge an elevated price and stave off 
competition, thus causing the government harm by overcharging. 
In both cases, the measure of damages from the consum-
er/government perspective is what the price of the product would 
have been absent the fraudulently obtained patent (or, in Walker 
Process claims, patent misuse). Where a Walker Process claim is 
supported, an FCA claim will be as well, though the reverse is not 
necessarily true. 
One way of proving an FCA violation would then be to prove 
monopolization, as under a Walker Process counterclaim. But a pa-
tentee need not monopolize a definable market in order to raise 
prices. Excluding others from making a patented improvement to a 
product can justify charging a higher price without capturing or 
monopolizing an entire market. Because a Walker Process claim re-
lies on antitrust laws, it is subject to a more stringent set of rules 
than is needed to prove an FCA claim. A violation of Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act, for example, requires that the accused infringer 
show that the patentee has market power and engaged in anticom-
petitive conduct, thereby causing an antitrust injury.138 
In practice, proving market power presents a significant hurdle 
to Walker Process claimants. Although market power can be proven 
by either direct or circumstantial evidence, patents by themselves 
do not necessarily confer monopoly power.139 The fact that a com-
pany holds a patent on a particular product does not demonstrate a 
lack of alternative devices in the marketplace. As such, identifying 
the relevant market is itself a challenging and often determinative 
                                                                                                                            
138 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–571 (1966). 
139 Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir.1995); 
Northern Pacific R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 10, n.8 (1958); see Robert Merges, 
Reflections on Current Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 793, 793 (1988). 
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analysis.140 In Unitherm Food System v. Swift-Eckrich, the Federal 
Circuit explained that a relevant product market is composed of 
“products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes 
for which they are produced.”141 There, the Federal Circuit over-
turned the lower court’s finding of market power, which was pre-
dicated on expert testimony that the patented products were tech-
nologically unique. The Federal Circuit stressed that the proper 
inquiry is not technological substitutability of a product, but eco-
nomic substitutability.142 Therefore, where a patented product is 
economically substitutable with another product, market power 
cannot be established even when a patentee is nonetheless able to 
raise prices.143 This significant challenge must be overcome in a 
claim asserting Walker Process fraud, but would not necessarily 
hinder an FCA claim based on inequitable conduct. 
Under a Walker Process theory, an accused infringer must also 
show that the patent holder has engaged in anticompetitive con-
duct. This amounts to not only showing that the patent was ob-
tained through fraud, but that the patent holder was aware that the 
patent was acquired through fraud at the time of the lawsuit.144 In 
circumstances where a patent holder prosecuted the patent in 
question, such a showing is straightforward. However, when the 
patent holder was not involved in the prosecution of the patent ap-
plication (for example, because the patent was licensed or pur-
chased from another party), this element proves more difficult. 
Under an FCA claim based on inequitable conduct, by contrast, a 
relator need only show that the patentee billed the government 
while deliberately ignoring or recklessly disregarding the fraudulent 
                                                                                                                            
140 See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(overturning a jury verdict where the court determined the relevant market to be 
essentially the patented invention and failed to consider products that were economically 
substitutable). 
141 See id. at 1363 (quoting United States v. AMR Corp, 335 F.3d 1109, 1113 (10th Cit. 
2003)). 
142 Unitherm, 375 F.3d at 1363–64. 
143 See id. 
144 See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1069–70 (Fed. Cir. 
1988); see also David Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Patent Exclusions After Therasense 26 (U. 
Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-39, Dec. 12, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1916074. 
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circumstances under which the patent was obtained.145 Thus, the 
bar is again lower for FCA claims than similar Walker Process 
claims. 
Hence, while Walker Process claims and FCA claims for ine-
quitable conduct overlap significantly, there are material differenc-
es between the two theories. Unlike FCA claims, Walker Process 
claims require proof of monopolization conduct, market definition, 
and market power. While Walker Process claims focus on the paten-
tee’s conduct while in possession of a patent, FCA claims based on 
inequitable conduct focus on the fraudulent actions of the patentee 
before the USPTO and the subsequent ability to charge higher 
prices. Defenses regarding market power (i.e. one’s ability to 
charge a fraudulently higher price) could arise in FCA litigation, 
but showing market power is not a necessary element as it would be 
in a Walker Process claim. 
Overall, Walker Process claims are significantly more difficult to 
prove than FCA claims. This suggests that if inequitable conduct 
can serve as the basis for an antitrust claim, it should clearly be suf-
ficient to serve as the basis for the more easily proved FCA claims. 
The only area where FCA claims face a higher burden than Walker 
Process claims is at the pleading stage of litigation. While both theo-
ries implicate Rule 9(b) in that fraud on the PTO must be pled with 
particularity, only the FCA claim (and only in certain circuits) 
would also require a plaintiff to include representative examples of 
false claims made to the government.146 However, this difference in 
pleading standards between the two theories does not alter the 
conclusion that the factual underpinnings necessary to support a 
Walker Process antitrust counterclaim should be more than suffi-
cient to support an FCA claim based on inequitable conduct. 
C. Suitability of Inequitable Conduct as a Basis in FCA Actions 
While the analogy to Walker Process counterclaims suggests si-
milarities with Amphastar’s FCA claim, it is not yet clear how lia-
bility under the FCA can arise due to inequitable conduct and 
                                                                                                                            
145 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1) defines knowledge as (1) having actual knowledge, (2) acting 
in deliberate ignorance, or (3) reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information. 
146 See supra note 43. 
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whether such liability is proper. Here, we discuss the difficulty of 
proving Amphastar’s novel theory of FCA liability, and the prob-
lems associated with allowing inequitable conduct to serve as the 
basis for an FCA violation. 
1. Challenges of Establishing Liability 
The path to establishing FCA liability based on inequitable 
conduct is fraught with obstacles. Any plaintiff alleging an FCA 
violation must prove three essential elements: (1) the defendant 
made a claim for payment from the government, (2) the claim was 
false or fraudulent, and (3) the defendant made the claim with 
knowledge of the falsity.147 An FCA suit based on an inequitable-
conduct theory draws upon two discrete instances of fraud. First, 
the patentee must have committed fraudulent acts while prosecut-
ing the patent application as discussed in Part II. Second, the pa-
tentee must have known of the fraudulent acquisition of the patent 
and nevertheless made claims for payment to the government at 
prices above what it could have charged absent its fraudulently ob-
tained patent and/or enforcement of that patent. Presumably, an 
accused infringer would only raise a false claims allegation after a 
court had made a finding of inequitable conduct, though it is possi-
ble for a competitor to file suit before the court issues a final ruling 
of inequitable conduct, based solely on evidence uncovered by the 
accused infringer in discovery. However, because some circuits 
require that FCA claims be pled with representative examples of 
false claims made to the government, an alleged infringer who 
plans to bring a false claims allegation claim may need to conduct 
additional investigations beyond what is discovered in the patent 
infringement case in order to adequately plead the FCA claim. This 
could include Freedom of Information Act-type requests for infor-
mation regarding payments made by the government. 
Because two separate instances of fraud need to be proven, an 
FCA claim will likely be heavily fact-dependent. The first ele-
ment—that the patentee made a claim for payment from the gov-
ernment—could likely be proven merely by pointing to the defen-
dant’s promotion and sale of products that were paid for through 
                                                                                                                            
147 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012); Burke v. Record Press, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 26, 
29 (D.D.C. 2013). 
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government programs, such as Medicare, as seen in Amphastar’s 
allegations against Aventis.148 The second element—that the claim 
was false or fraudulent—would be established by showing that a 
patent was acquired through inequitable conduct, allowing the pa-
tentee to sell its product at elevated prices.149 The third element—
proving that the patent holder made the claim with knowledge of 
the falsity—would further require that the defendant, at the very 
least, had reckless disregard in charging those elevated prices for 
products purchased (or reimbursed) with government funds. 
Recasting these elements to more directly address an FCA 
claim based on inequitable conduct, a plaintiff much show (1) that 
the government purchased a product incorporating the patented 
subject matter; (2) that the patent was obtained due to inequitable 
conduct before the patent office, allowing the patent holder to 
charge inflated prices; and (3) the patentee knew or showed reck-
less disregard in charging the government at these inflated pric-
es.150 
Showing that a patent holder in fact sold a patented product at 
elevated prices may be straightforward in some instances, but it 
could be the subject of extensive expert testimony. If a plaintiff can 
obtain documentation from either the government or the patent 
holder establishing that a claim for payment for the patented prod-
uct was made, then the first element of the FCA claim is met. But 
even if this can be shown, there remains the formidable hurdle of 
                                                                                                                            
148 See Memorandum and Order, supra note 2. 
149 This element can then be broken into two distinct parts, subject to different types of 
proof: (1) the patent was fraudulently acquired, provable with reference to 
communications with the patent office and internal communications demonstrating 
knowledge of omitted materials; and (2) that the patent actually allowed the patentee to 
charge elevated prices, which likely requires economic expert testimony and evidence 
that either the patentee was able to exclude competitors from the market or was able to 
use its patent to tout a unique feature or characteristic of its product that justified 
elevated prices. If the patent was not obtained by fraud, there is no fraudulent claim 
submitted to the government. Likewise, if the patent had no effect on the price charged to 
the government, there would be no false or fraudulent claim submitted to the 
government. 
150 Mirroring the elements of an FCA violation: (1) that the defendant made a claim for 
payment from the government, (2) that the claim was false or fraudulent and (3) the 
defendant made the claim with knowledge of the falsity. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012); 
Burke v. Record Press, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 26, 29 (D.D.C. 2013). 
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overcoming a Rule 9(b) objection at the pleading stage. Rule 9(b) 
requires that allegations of fraud, such as violations under the 
FCA, must be pled with particularity to ensure that frivolous and 
unsupported claims do not make their way into court.151 The dis-
trict court in Aventis v. Amphastar, for example, ruled in favor of 
Aventis on its motion to dismiss Amphastar’s qui tam suit because 
of Amphastar’s failure to plead with particularity that a false claim 
was made.152 However, the court granted Amphastar leave to 
amend its complaint, and Amphastar was able to add additional de-
tails to its amended complaint that satisfied the pleading require-
ment. Absent such specificity in the allegations, a court is likely to 
dismiss any such FCA claim. Potential plaintiffs must therefore 
rely on documentation or other evidence uncovered in the underly-
ing patent litigation (or otherwise available to them) rather than 
mere unsupported allegations. This may have practical implica-
tions for parties facing inequitable conduct allegations as well as the 
courts moderating these disputes.153 
To meet the second element of an FCA claim, the plaintiff 
must first prove that a patent was obtained due to inequitable con-
duct. In some cases, the plaintiff could simply rely on a court’s 
finding of inequitable conduct in an underlying patent infringement 
action. But if, for example, the underlying litigation is stayed or as-
yet unresolved, one may need to affirmatively plead the elements of 
an inequitable conduct defense. Next, the plaintiff must prove that 
the price the government paid—or for which the FCA defendant 
submitted claims—was higher than it would have been absent the 
enforcement of the now-unenforceable patent. This essentially re-
quires a showing of actual harm to the government and a causal link 
between the inequitable conduct and the fraudulent overcharging. 
                                                                                                                            
151 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). Note, however, that not all circuits require that examples of an 
actual claim be pled in an FCA complaint. In the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh 
Circuits, FCA claims must be pled with representative samples of the alleged fraudulent 
conduct. Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 155 (3d Cir. 2014). 
However, in the First, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, FCA claims only need to be pled 
with particular details of a scheme to submit false claims and reliable indicia that lead to a 
strong inference that claims were actually submitted. Id. at 156–57. 
152 Amphastar Pharm. Inc. v. Aventis Pharma SA, No. EDCV-09-0023 MJG, 2012 WL 
5512466, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2012). 
153 See infra Part IV. 
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Thus, the court must distinguish between instances where the pa-
tented device or component caused an actual increase in the price 
of the product with instances where having a patent on the tech-
nology may have had no such effects. In practice, it is likely that 
this type of analysis would closely mirror the analysis conducted 
under the Sherman Act in establishing monopoly power. For ex-
ample, although a showing of monopoly power is not necessary to 
prove that prices were in fact elevated, such a showing can create 
an inference of unlawfully elevated prices where actual direct evi-
dence is lacking. In contrast, if the patentee’s competitors used al-
ternative components not covered by the patent, then the presence 
of the patent may not have actually enabled the patent holder to 
charge a supra-competitive price. Economically substitutable alter-
natives may negate one’s ability to charge elevated prices, just as 
they negate a finding of monopoly power. That said, a showing of 
monopoly power is not necessarily needed to show that prices were 
elevated; an FCA claim may be therefore be sustained without the 
patentee having monopoly power. For example, if a pioneering 
smart phone manufacturer developed a new, faster processor, pa-
tented the technology, and subsequently used that processor in a 
particular brand of smart phones, the price of that brand of smart 
phone may increase simply because it is the only phone in the mar-
ket with the faster processor. That does not, however, indicate that 
the company has the ability to fix prices in the entire mobile-phone 
industry, nor would it be necessary to show such market power to 
prove an FCA claim. 
This analysis may be slightly different in the context of the 
pharmaceutical industry. In order to market a new prescription 
drug, a pioneering pharmaceutical company must first obtain regu-
latory approval from the Food and Drug Administration.154 As part 
of the approval process, the pharmaceutical company must list all 
patents that claim its brand-name drug in the FDA’s so-called 
Orange Book.155 Listing these patents in the Orange Book essentially 
                                                                                                                            
154 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into 
interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application . . . is effective 
with respect to such drug.”). 
155 The “Orange Book” is the common name for the FDA publication “Approved Drug 
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations.” This publication is updated 
monthly. FDA, CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS 
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prevents the FDA from granting a competitor the right to market 
and sell a generic version of the patented drug unless the generic 
challenger (i.e., ANDA applicant) can show that the patent is 
invalid or not infringed by the proposed generic.156 It is almost axi-
omatic that products without a generic competitor, even if they 
face economic competition from drugs that target similar symp-
toms, are priced significantly higher than generics. And because the 
mere filing of an application to manufacture a patented drug is con-
sidered an action of patent infringement,157 the mere listing of these 
patents in the Orange Book is a de facto act of patent assertion that 
alone can lead to significantly elevated prices. If the drug patent 
was acquired by fraud on the patent office, then the second element 
of an FCA claim is likely proven. Whereas a Walker Process claim 
on that basis might depend on an actual showing of monopoliza-
tion, an FCA claim against a brand-name drug manufacturer could 
likely rely solely on the fact that the exclusivity provided by the 
FDA itself permits the patent holder to charge significantly ele-
vated prices (in part because it serves as a bar to competition). 
Under the third element of an FCA claim, a plaintiff must also 
prove that the patent holder knowingly, or at least recklessly, over-
                                                                                                                            
WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (2008) [hereinafter Orange Book], 
available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/docs/preface/ecpreface.htm. The FDCA 
requires a patent holder to include in its NDA “the patent number and the expiration 
date of any patent which claims the drug for which the applicant submitted the 
application or which claims a method of using such drug and with respect to which a 
claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the 
owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.” 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) 
(2012). The patent numbers and expiration dates are then published in the Orange Book. 
Process patents and certain composition of matter patents are precluded from being listed 
in the Orange Book, though generic manufacturers may still be sued for infringing these 
unlisted patents. 
156 See generally Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch–Waxman Act by 
Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 
171 (2008); Matthew Avery & Mary Nguyen, The Roadblock for Generic Drugs: Declaratory 
Judgment Jurisdiction for Later Generic Challengers, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2013), 
available at http://ncjolt.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Avery-+-Nguyen-Final.pdf. 
157 The Hatch–Waxman Act provides that filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application 
(“ANDA”) with a so-called Paragraph IV certification that the patent is invalid or will 
not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the generic drug for which the 
application is submitted is itself an act of patent infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) 
(“It shall be an act of infringement to submit . . . an [ANDA] for a drug claimed in a 
patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent . . . .”). 
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charged the government. This means that the plaintiff must con-
vince a judge or jury that the patent holder knew, should have 
known, or recklessly disregarded (1) that the patent would be unen-
forceable for reasons of inequitable conduct and (2) that in the ab-
sence of this enforcement, the price of the product would have 
been lower than what was charged to the government. Because a 
plaintiff relying on Amphastar’s theory of FCA liability would like-
ly only file suit after a finding of inequitable conduct in the underly-
ing patent infringement case, proving that the patentee knew or 
should have known that the patent was unenforceable may be a 
simple matter of res judicata. Inequitable conduct already requires 
proving but-for materiality and specific intent to deceive the patent 
office. Thus, a finding of inequitable conduct will necessarily in-
clude a finding that the patentee had specific intent to withhold 
material information from the patent office. As such, a showing of 
inequitable conduct in the underlying patent infringement case 
alone should be sufficient to demonstrate in an FCA case that the 
patentee knew or should have known that its patent would not have 
otherwise been granted and would be unenforceable under the law. 
However, this is not the case if the patent holder was not the party 
that engaged in the inequitable conduct, but merely acquired the 
patent after the fact. In that case, it may be more difficult for the 
FCA plaintiff to establish that the patent holder had knowledge 
that the patent would be unenforceable. Without a showing of this 
knowledge, establishing the second portion of this element would 
not be possible. 
Lastly, showing that, in the absence of the patent holder’s frau-
dulently obtained patent, the price of the relevant product would 
have been lower than what was charged to the government will 
likely be more difficult for an FCA plaintiff to prove. Knowing that 
a particular patent is unenforceable does not necessarily indicate 
that a patent holder knows that its pricing of a product is elevated, 
especially on products covered by multiple patents. Further, the 
product might incorporate other unique features or rely on brand-
ing to justify a higher price than other alternatives in the market. 
Absent a clear causal relationship between the fraudulently ob-
tained patent and the elevated price, or a showing of monopoliza-
tion based on that patent, it may be difficult to prove elevated pric-
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ing, and even more difficult to prove that a defendant knew of such 
elevated pricing. While the FCA only requires the plaintiff to show 
the patent holder recklessly disregarded the risk that the govern-
ment was being overcharged, there remains a heavy burden of 
proof that the plaintiff must overcome. Again, however, in the 
pharmaceutical context, the burden of proof is likely lowered by the 
industry-wide price disparity between generic and patent-protected 
drugs, and the fact that most brand-name drugs are only covered by 
a few patents.158 
2. Is Such Liability Proper? 
Antitrust claims, such as Walker Process claims, do not extend 
liability to all improper conduct of patent holders in the market-
place, as the Sherman Act requires proof of additional elements.159 
Where the Sherman Act requires proving both that the defendant 
had market power in a relevant market and inflicted an antitrust 
harm, an FCA suit based on inequitable conduct would merely re-
quire proof that prices were in fact higher such that the govern-
ment was actually overcharged. Unlike a Walker Process claim, en-
gaging in the often-difficult task of defining a relevant market and 
showing whether a party has acquired or is likely to acquire mono-
poly power would be unnecessary to prove an FCA claim. 
In contrast to the Sherman Act, which is only intended to stop 
specific antitrust harms, the scope of the FCA is broad and is “in-
tended to reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might 
result in financial loss to the Government.”160 The FCA incenti-
vizes whistleblowers with knowledge of fraud on the government to 
come forward with that information. As a result of this incentive 
                                                                                                                            
158 See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take To Make a Drug? 
Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. 
REV. 299, 300 (2010) (“The average was nearly 3.5 patents per drug in 2005, with over 
five patents per drug for the best-selling pharmaceuticals; these numbers have increased 
over time.”). 
159 The Sherman Act requires a showing that the defendant has monopoly power or is 
likely to acquire monopoly power. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–
71 (1966) (“The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) 
the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or 
maintenance of that power . . . .”). 
160 United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
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system, nearly $35 billion has been recovered in the past thirty 
years, with over seventy percent of FCA suits being filed by private 
relators.161 Consequently, holding liable those patentees who ac-
quired their patents through fraud for selling their patented prod-
ucts to the government at elevated prices seems to align with the 
purpose of the FCA. Moreover, extending FCA liability to situa-
tions where patent holders are knowingly overcharging the gov-
ernment, and by extension taxpayers, is consistent with recent 
modifications to both the FCA and the doctrine of inequitable con-
duct. 
The FCA was recently modified under the Affordable Care Act 
to cover more fraudulent acts than ever before. Congress signifi-
cantly diminished the public disclosure bar, which was the most 
credible objection a party might raise in defending against a false 
claims allegation.162 In principle, once a finding of inequitable con-
duct has been publicly released, relators should be prevented from 
raising qui tam claims. Prior to the Affordable Care Act, the FCA 
explicitly stated that information publicly disclosed through civil 
litigation would raise the public disclosure bar.163 Under the Af-
fordable Care Act amendments, however, public disclosure during 
litigation only triggers the bar when the government is also a party 
to the suit.164 Even if the public disclosure bar is properly invoked, 
a relator would have two possible remedies. First, if the govern-
ment objects to the court dismissing the case, then the relator may 
proceed with the claim.165 Second, the Affordable Care Act lo-
                                                                                                                            
161 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS – OVERVIEW, OCT. 1, 1987 – SEPT. 30, 
2013, (Dec. 23, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-
FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf; Joel D. Hesch, Breaking the Siege: Restoring Equity and 
Statutory Intent to the Process of Determining Qui Tam Relator Awards Under the False 
Claims Act, 29 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 217, 229 (2012) (“Whistleblower qui tam suits have 
become the Government’s chief anti-fraud tool and account for about 70% of all funds the 
DOJ recovers from defrauders.”). 
162 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. 783–84 (2010) 
(enacted). 
163 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2009). 
164 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(i) (2012) (“The court shall dismiss an action or claim 
under this section, unless opposed by the Government, if substantially the same 
allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed … in a 
Federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in which the Government or its agent is a 
party . . . .”). 
165 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2009). 
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wered the threshold for acquiring the “original source” status that 
provides an exception to the public disclosure bar. The FCA pre-
viously required that a relator must have “direct and independent 
knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based” 
in order to qualify as an original source.166 This definition was al-
tered by the Affordable Care Act to include relators who merely 
have “knowledge that is independent of and materially adds” to 
the allegations raised.167 
Shortly after Congress enacted these changes to the FCA, the 
Federal Circuit coincidentally raised the standards for proving ine-
quitable conduct in Therasense to include only the most egregious 
of frauds.168 While inequitable conduct previously only required a 
showing that an omitted reference or misrepresentation was ma-
terial, the Therasense standard requires “but-for” materiality.169 
Thus, the reference must have been so material that the examiner 
would not have issued the patent absent the patentee applicant’s 
deception. Additionally, Therasense requires a finding that the pa-
tent applicant had specific intent to deceive the examiner.170 Such 
intent must be affirmatively established and cannot simply be in-
ferred from the materiality of the omitted source or misrepresenta-
tion.171 These heightened requirements mean that only the most 
egregious frauds committed against the USPTO will rise to the lev-
el of inequitable conduct. 
The broadening of the FCA over several decades, combined 
with the recent narrowing of the inequitable conduct doctrine, has 
made claims like Amphastar’s feasible. The FCA was created to 
stop fraudulent appropriation of taxpayer funds. Using inequitable 
conduct as the basis for an FCA claim aligns with this policy, espe-
cially under the heightened Therasense standard which punishes 
only the most egregious forms of fraud before the patent office. 
These instances of fraud, coupled with the patent holder’s know-
ledge that its own fraud affects the prices paid by the government, 
                                                                                                                            
166 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2009). 
167 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2012). 
168 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
169 Id. at 1291. 
170 See id. at 1290. 
171 See id. 
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are precisely what the FCA was designed to punish. The broaden-
ing of the FCA and the parallel heightening of the inequitable con-
duct standard have therefore created a substantial overlap where 
liability can be found in the most egregious cases of fraudulent 
conduct. 
IV. AVOIDING FALSE CLAIMS LIABILITY 
In light of the attention Amphastar’s suit is receiving in the 
false claims bar, it is important that attorneys involved in patent 
prosecution or false claims litigation consider steps to limit or avoid 
liability under the FCA. The FCA bears the extreme penalty of 
treble damages, a large portion of which, when based on a theory of 
inequitable conduct, will likely go directly to a competitor. In this 
section we highlight several measures attorneys and their clients 
may consider taking to limit exposure to FCA liability. 
A. Contractual Additions When Purchasing Patents 
In situations where clients are purchasing or licensing patents 
from another party, attorneys should consider the possibility of 
FCA liability that could arise as a result of the seller or licensor’s 
inequitable conduct. Several simple steps taken at the outset of 
one’s manufacture or sale of patented products, including particu-
lar considerations included in any licensing contracts, could avoid 
significant liability and minimize legal expenses in defending 
against a suit brought under the FCA. For example, a licensee or 
purchaser of a patent may wish to insert into any license or pur-
chase agreement provisions making clear that the license or pur-
chase is not limited to the patent itself, and will survive invalidity, 
or guaranteeing partial reimbursement if the patent is invalidated as 
well as indemnification against potential actions relating to gov-
ernment overcharges stemming from inequitable conduct. It may 
also be beneficial to include in such contracts representations that 
seller or licensor of the patent believes in good faith that each pa-
tent involved is valid and enforceable. Having such clear represen-
tations from the original patentee will provide additional evidence 
that the current patent owner had no knowledge that the patent 
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was unenforceable under the law and therefore could not have kno-
wingly overcharged the government. 
Likewise, a party selling patented goods to the government 
should consider inserting provisions in its contracts providing for 
single reimbursement upon a showing that its patent is invalid or 
unenforceable.172 Alternatively, arbitration clauses, or clauses that 
otherwise avoid payment of treble damages where inequitable con-
duct is found could prove to be an effective tool to limit exposure 
to FCA liability. 
B. Court Orders to Seal Evidence of Inequitable Conduct 
When inequitable conduct has been discovered in an underly-
ing patent litigation, the patentee should attempt to seal evidence 
of the inequitable conduct to prevent it from being used in a subse-
quent FCA suit. Because FCA claims must be pled with particular-
ity, sealing evidence of the basis for the alleged fraud (i.e., evidence 
of the fraudulent obtained patent) may allow the FCA defendant to 
get the claim dismissed at the pleading stage. However, sealing 
such evidence may be challenging. The presumption of public 
access to court records is rooted in the First Amendment. The Su-
preme Court of California has noted that “every lower court opi-
nion of which we are aware that has addressed the issue of First 
Amendment access to civil trials and proceedings has reached the 
conclusion that the constitutional right of access applies to civil as 
well as to criminal trials.”173 Several circuits also have recognized a 
constitutional right of access to court records, with the Ninth Cir-
cuit noting that “the public and press have a first amendment right 
of access to pretrial documents in general.”174 This extends to dis-
covery documents, where “[g]enerally, the public can gain access 
to litigation documents and information produced during discovery 
unless the party opposing disclosure shows ‘good cause’ why a 
protective order is necessary.”175 However, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure provide several exceptions to the general rule of 
                                                                                                                            
172 That is, a provision limiting potential damages to restitution or reimbursement, and 
waiving any right to seek treble damages. 
173 NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 358 (Cal. 1999). 
174 Associated Press v. United States District Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983). 
175 Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 289 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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public access. Rule 26(c) provides that “[u]pon motion by a party 
or by a person from whom discovery is sought . . . and for good 
cause shown, the court in which the action is pending . . . may 
make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person 
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 
expense.”176 Rule 26(c) specifically contemplates issuance of a pro-
tective order to ensure that “trade secret or other confidential re-
search, development, or commercial information not be revealed or 
be revealed only in a designated way.”177 This exception is often 
used to prevent or severely restrict the disclosure of source code, 
trade secrets, and other highly sensitive corporate information, par-
ticularly information that could provide a competitive advantage to 
competitors if disclosed.178 
Because much of the discovery oriented toward uncovering in-
equitable conduct delves into what the inventors of patented tech-
nologies or processes knew at the time they filed their patent appli-
cation, including lab notes, internal reports and the like, the trade 
secret exception to public disclosure could be used to restrict the 
release of that information. As seen in the Northern District of Cal-
ifornia’s model protective order for patent and trade secret cases, 
such discovery can be restricted to attorneys’ eyes only, and the 
standard order requires the destruction or return of any such in-
formation or documentation discovered within a short period after 
the end of the litigation.179 Such a protective order could complete-
ly preclude third parties from uncovering documents supporting an 
FCA claim, and could also present a strong bar to the opposing par-
ty’s use of such documents in subsequent FCA litigation. 
                                                                                                                            
176 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
177 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(7). 
178 See, e.g., Model Protective Order for Litigation Involving Patents, Highly Sensitive 
Confidential Information and/or Trade Secrets, available at http://www.cand.us
courts.gov/model-protective-orders. 
179 See id. ¶ 7.1 (“Basic Principles. A Receiving Party may use Protected Material that is 
disclosed or produced by another Party or by a Non-Party in connection with this case 
only for prosecuting, defending, or attempting to settle this litigation. Such Protected 
Material may be disclosed only to the categories of persons and under the conditions 
described in this Order. When the litigation has been terminated, a Receiving Party must 
comply with the provisions of section 15 below (FINAL DISPOSITION).”); see also id. ¶ 
15 (“Within 60 days after the final disposition of this action . . . each Receiving Party must 
return all Protected Material to the Producing Party or destroy such material.”) 
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Accordingly, parties accused of inequitable conduct during pa-
tent infringement suits would be well served by insistence on 
strong protective orders in the underlying patent litigation. Under 
an order such as the Northern District of California’s model, any-
thing acquired by the defendant in discovery that is covered by the 
terms of the protective order would be protected from use in a sub-
sequent suit.180 While Walker Process claims are often brought as 
counterclaims in the underlying patent litigation, and thus can rely 
on the documents produced in that same case, a qui tam action 
must be filed as a separate case and delivered to the attorney gener-
al for their approval. Thus, a protective order could prevent a FCA 
plaintiff from successfully pleading its claims, and it would likely be 
difficult for the plaintiff to unseal the evidence of inequitable con-
duct. In the words of the Second Circuit, “[i]t is ‘presumptively 
unfair for courts to modify protective orders which assure confi-
dentiality and upon which the parties have reasonably relied.’” 181 
C. Public Disclosure of the Fraud 
The public disclosure bar prevents a qui tam plaintiff from 
bringing suit if the fraud has been publicly disclosed. Theoretically, 
a patent holder could avoid liability by publicly disclosing its own 
fraud. For example, if a patent holder learns that its patent is unen-
forceable due to prior fraudulent activity of the patent applicant, 
                                                                                                                            
180 See id. ¶ 1. 
181 AT&T Corp. v. Sprint Corp., 407 F.3d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting SEC v. 
TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 230 (2d Cir. 2001)). Note, however, that several other 
circuits have permitted modifications of protective orders in “collateral litigation.” See In 
re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 333 F. Supp. 2d 333, 340 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (permitting a 
modification because the reliance interest of objecting parties “can be preserved by 
subjecting the intervenor to the provisions of a protective order” where such protection 
are necessary); see also Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (“Where reasonable restrictions on collateral disclosure will continue to 
protect an affected party’s legitimate interests in privacy, a collateral litigant’s request to 
the issuing court to modify an otherwise proper protective order so that collateral litigants 
are not precluded from obtaining relevant material should generally be granted.”). 
Interestingly, the First Circuit found that permitting modification of a protective order to 
grant a third party access to documents would be especially inappropriate in the event 
that the Federal Government was the proposed intervenor. See Public Citizen v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 791 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Martindell v. International 
Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979). In an FCA case, of course, 
the federal government is the party involved, even if represented by a qui tam relator. 
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publicly disclosing this information might raise a public disclosure 
bar. Likewise, publicly disclosing one’s fraud via a press release as 
soon as the question of inequitable conduct has been decided, pre-
ferably couched in terms that disclose the facts but avoid terms like 
“fraud,” could avoid liability. Attorneys should be cautious with 
this approach, however, as the recent amendments to the FCA es-
sentially allow for the government to have the final word as to 
whether public disclosure will ultimately prevent the relator from 
pursuing a qui tam suit. Approaching the government directly with 
such information may be a far better approach and may avoid po-
tentially embarrassing public disclosures. This proactive approach 
could also lead to the possibility of amicable settlements with mi-
nimal public disclosure (and thus minimal embarrassment for the 
patentee). 
V. PREVENTING THE PLAGUE: SUGGESTIONS FOR 
LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
If the courts validate Amphastar’s novel theory, nearly every 
patent holder that sells patent products to the federal government 
could be at risk for liability under the FCA. In this section we dis-
cuss amendments to the FCA that may help to ensure fair treat-
ment to patent holders while maintaining effective disincentives for 
fraudulently overcharging the government. 
A. Limiting Damages in False Claims Suits 
Fraudulent conduct during prosecution of a patent application 
can lead to harsh consequences. But at some point those conse-
quences become so cumbersome as to both hinder the effectiveness 
and efficiency of patent prosecution as well as punish wrongdoers 
to an extent that is incommensurate with their behavior. Currently, 
the most egregious of such fraud may incur the harsh penalties of 
an inequitable conduct finding (the patent and related patents are 
rendered unenforceable) and treble damages under the Sherman 
Act (i.e. Walker Process fraud). Now, under Amphastar’s theory, 
inequitable conduct may also lead to false claims liability and possi-
bly treble damages for suits filed by either the government or a rela-
tor. However, the omissions or misrepresentations forming the ba-
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sis of an inequitable conduct defense would likely occur long before 
the sale of any goods to the government and would only be te-
nuously connected to such a sale. As such, punishing this type of 
fraud via the False Claims Act seems to be far beyond what was 
envisioned by President Lincoln when he enacted this law in 1863. 
To bring the scope of the FCA back in line with its original in-
tent, we urge the enactment of legislation to provide for and alle-
viate some of these harsh realities. First, providing a specific reme-
dy for products covered by fraudulently obtained patents may pro-
vide one avenue for such reform. Alternatively, limiting damages 
under Amphastar’s theory to actual damages could soften the po-
tentially overbearing FCA liability. While making false claims to 
the United States government should obviously be punished, the 
punishment should be proportional to the wrongful conduct. Fur-
thermore, treble damages are arguably unnecessary under the Am-
phastar theory since treble damages are already available to clai-
mants under a Walker Process theory. 
B. Negating Liability by Granting Amnesty or Curing Inequitable 
Conduct 
Another option is to grant amnesty to patent holders who come 
forward regarding fraud on the government, along the lines of the 
amnesty granted under the US Government’s Antitrust Criminal 
Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act (“ACPERA”).182 This 
would provide a way to avoid the threat of treble damages, or even 
to reduce overall liability for companies that voluntarily come 
clean. Nor, as discussed above, would the fact of the inequitable 
conduct itself automatically lead to damages. The patent owner 
would still preserve potentially strong arguments regarding causa-
tion and damages, and could likely escape with a settlement signifi-
cantly lower than the possible liability in a treble-damages scenario. 
The ACPERA program has been very effective in limiting liability 
in antitrust cases and incentivizing private parties to come forward, 
but its use has been limited essentially to cartel cases where parties 
are faced with a “prisoner’s dilemma” of either cooperating with 
the government and admitting to a conspiracy, thereby limiting 
                                                                                                                            
182 Pub. L. No. 108-237, tit. II, 118 Stat. 661, 665. 
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their own liability, or continuing to operate under the conspiracy 
and risking heightened liability.183 In the FCA context, as under 
ACPERA, competitors are strongly incentivized to turn in their 
competitors. Patent holders, by contrast, are strongly disincenti-
vized from admitting inequitable conduct because it could invali-
date a valuable patent. In the pharmaceutical context, the removal 
of patent protection can result in immediate generic competition 
and a ninety percent reduction in drug prices and, as a conse-
quence, in profits.184 But the fact that ACPERA relies on a prison-
er’s-dilemma incentive does not preclude an amnesty program in-
volving monopolists from succeeding. Rather, the likely effect of 
such a program would be a race to disclosure in cases where the 
proverbial tea leaves make it clear that a finding of inequitable con-
duct is likely. 
Alternatively, the new supplemental examination procedures 
created as part of the America Invents Act of 2011 could be used to 
rehabilitate patents tainted by inequitable conduct. Prior to the pas-
sage of the America Invents Act, inequitable conduct was consi-
dered an unfixable injury that was fatal to patent protection. While 
other deficiencies in a patent could be cured by reissue or reexami-
nation,185 inequitable conduct could not. Supplemental examina-
tion is a new procedure introduced by the America Invents Act. It 
is available for all patents and can be instituted if a substantial new 
question of patentability is raised by any information relevant to the 
patents. Supplemental examination is specifically designed to allow 
the USPTO to consider prior art that should have been disclosed 
by the patentee during the normal application procedure, removing 
                                                                                                                            
183 See Michael W. Scarborough & Dylan I. Ballard, The Case for Eliminating ACPERA’s 
Supplemental Cooperation Requirement for Amnesty Applicants, 20 COMPETITION: J. ANTI. & 
UNFAIR COMP. L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 34, 35, 43 (2011) (“It has been suggested by some 
observers that the amnesty applicant’s ACPERA dilemma–either fail to cooperate and 
risk being subjected to heightened civil liability, or attempt to cooperate and risk fatally 
undermining one’s case on the merits (and still fail to secure any guarantee of reduced 
liability)–does not often obtain in practice because amnesty applicants typically lack 
strong defenses on the merits.”). 
184 See Benjamin G. Druss et al., Listening To Generic Prozac: Winners, Losers, And 
Sideliners, 23 HEALTH AFF. 210, 213–14 (2004). 
185 See, e.g., Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1341 n.6 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (curing deficiencies by reissue); Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 
1172, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (curing deficiencies by reexamination). 
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the possibility of inequitable conduct based upon failure to disclose 
the prior art. A request for supplemental examination may only be 
filed by the patent owner. If the request is granted, the USPTO 
may order an ex parte reexamination to address the issues raised. 
After supplemental examination, a patent cannot be held unenfor-
ceable due to conduct relating to inadequate disclosure during the 
prior examination of the patent if that conduct is corrected during 
supplemental examination, effectively creating an opportunity for 
safe harbor against inequitable conduct that would otherwise rend-
er the patent unenforceable.186 However, if the Director of the 
USPTO becomes aware that material fraud on the patent office 
may have been committed in connection with the patent, the Di-
rector must refer the matter to the Attorney General.187 Conse-
quently, supplemental examination may be used to prevent possi-
ble liability under the FCA by negating possible claims of inequita-
ble conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Amphastar’s novel theory of False Claims Act liability based on 
a finding that Aventis engaged in inequitable conduct during the 
prosecution of its patent has already made waves among attorneys 
in the false-claims bar. The broadening of the FCA over the past 
several decades, combined with the recent narrowing of the ine-
quitable conduct doctrine in Therasense, has made Amphastar’s 
claim feasible. Furthermore, the legislative and judicial history sur-
rounding the FCA and the doctrine of inequitable conduct suggest 
that such liability is proper under the FCA. But the Amphastar liti-
gation is currently stalled in discovery disputes, and whether it will 
lead to a new plague of FCA liability for patent holders will not be 
known unless and until the suit is resolved in court. If Amphastar 
prevails, it will be responsible for dramatically expanding the scope 
of FCA liability, affecting both the false-claims attorneys who will 
have a new weapon in their arsenal and the patent attorneys who 
                                                                                                                            
186 See 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(1) (2012); see also Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, 
Toward a System of Invention Registration: The Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. 
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 24, 25 (2011) (calling supplemental examination an “amnesty 
program”). 
187 35 U.S.C. § 257(e) (2012). 
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may never have encountered the FCA before. In light of the ex-
treme penalty of treble damages for violating the FCA, a large por-
tion of which will likely go directly to a competitor, patentees and 
their attorneys would be wise to take proactive steps to limit or 
avoid liability under the FCA. 
